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INTRODUCTION 
A bond validation proceeding involves an implicit bargain between the legislature 
and municipalities. By providing for a bond validation proceeding, the legislature allows 
an expedited process that provides finality to any bond issuance. In exchange, 
municipalities are required to establish that they have folly and completely complied with 
the Bonding Act and any other applicable laws. The bond validation proceeding is not 
intended to be a "rubber stamp" that allows a municipality unlimited discretion and the 
ability to circumvent or evade all meaningful judicial review. Yet that is exactly how the 
City has interpreted the Bond Validation Act and the Bonding Act. 
In its brief, the City has not only argued that notice of the bond validation 
proceeding is not a due process requirement, but that the notice requirement of the Bond 
Validation Act is a technical one that can be fulfilled by placing notice in any newspaper 
printed within the municipality, regardless of whether the newspaper is read by the 
citizens of the municipality. The City claims that a bond may be validated even if the 
statutorily required public hearing has not yet been held because public input can still be 
taken before the bond is actually issued. It has interpreted the Bond Validation Act as 
permitting it to modify or otherwise amend its bond authorization and offering after the 
bond has been validated. And finally, it claims almost unlimited discretion to alter the 
scope of a project funded by bonds. The City's extreme position cannot be correct. If it 
were, the procedural safeguards in the Bond Validation Act and the Bonding Act would 
be eviscerated and voters would be denied any meaningful way to enforce their rights 
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under the bonding acts and due process. In addition, as long as representations in 
election brochures and other public materials were not intentionally misleading, 
municipalities would have no incentive to ensure that the representations were well 
researched or practical. As a result, prudence and common sense require that the rights 
of voters be safeguarded through a strict application of the procedural requirements and 
legal safeguards espoused by the bonding acts. 
First, both due process and the Bond Validation Act require that taxpayers be 
provided adequate notice of any bond validation proceeding. Validating a bond issuance 
prohibits a taxpayer from challenging any deficiencies in a municipality's compliance 
with t the law. If notice is not properly given, a municipality can evade strict scrutiny or 
any real challenge to validation of its bond - after all, a party who fails to attend a bond 
validation proceeding is prohibited from filing an appeal or a collateral attack. In this 
case, publication of notice in the Intermountain Commercial Record (the "IRC") not only 
failed to comply with the Bond Validation Act, it was not even the means most 
reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties of the proceedings. On this basis 
alone, the district court's order should be vacated and this case remanded for a new 
validation proceeding after proper notice has been given. 
Second, validation proceedings are ripe for abuse if they can be used to avoid the 
procedural requirements of the Bonding Act or insulate a bond from challenge before it is 
really finalized. Yet that is exactly what the City wants when it argues that the 
procedural requirements of the Bonding Act can be fulfilled or a bond resolution 
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modified after the bond issuance is validated. Under the implicit bargain of the Bond 
Validation Act, all of the requirements of the Bonding Act must be complied with before 
a bond may be authorized and validated. And the resolution authorizing issuance of a 
bond cannot be subject to modification after the bond has been validated. In this case, 
because the City as not fulfilled the public hearing requirement and has admitted that its 
bond resolution was not final, the district court's order must be vacated. 
Lastly, the City's discretion to change the scope of its project is not and cannot be 
unlimited. At some point, even if it hews to the same general purpose presented to the 
voters, a project becomes so materially different that it is no longer the project presented 
to and approved by the voters during the bond election. In this case, that point has been 
reached - the project that the City now seeks to issue bonds for is less than half the scope 
of the project that voters were promised. As a result, the district court's order must be 
vacated. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. The district court violated JRRN's due process rights when it published 
notice in a newspaper with at least 200 subscribers statewide and an unknown 
circulation in the city. 
The district court's order should be vacated because it was entered in violation of 
the Bond Validation Act's notice requirements and JRRN's due process rights.1 
Specifically, the district court never obtained personal jurisdiction over JRRN because 
publication of notice of the bond validation hearing in the Intermountain Commercial 
Record, a trade publication that is only known to have a daily circulation of 200 
subscribers, did not meet the requirements of the Bond Validation Act and was not 
reasonably calculated to apprise the approximately 180,000 citizens of Salt Lake City of 
the action. A court cannot enter a binding judgment against an individual unless it has 
first obtained personal jurisdiction. See Carlson v. Bos, 740 P.2d 1269, 1271 (Utah 1987) 
1
 The City has claimed that JRRN failed to preserve and/or waived this argument at the 
Hearing. However, this very same argument was raised by the City at the Hearing and 
explicitly rejected by the district court. Specifically, the district court held that: 
You're here today and the first thing you did was raise the issue of process. 
You're entitled to do that. So you didn't waive any defenses. I'm overruling 
your objection. I think if it was a 12(b) motion, probably a 12(b)(4), maybe a 
12(b)(5), but if it was either one, denying it would simply result in you having 
an appealable issue, should it ever get to that point. You have that issue. But 
now you're here because I've said you should be here and I've said process is 
sufficient. But I don't believe you've waived under 12(h) which it might have 
been in a circumstance where you were required to file an answer or a motion 
... So my view is that you - you haven't lost any rights and this is an issue 
you can raise at an appropriate time, but I think we need to go forward. 
See Hr'g Tr. 49-50. The City has not appealed this aspect of the district court's ruling. 
As a result, JRRN's right to raise this issue on appeal was explicitly preserved in the 
district court. 
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("[sjervice of process implements the procedural due process requirement that a 
defendant be informed of pending legal action and be provided with an opportunity to 
defend against the action"). Morevoer, "lack of [personal jurisdiction] is fatal to a court's 
authority to decide a case with respect to a particular litigant." Jackson Const. Co., Inc. v. 
Marrs, 2004 UT 89, ^ 8, 100 P.3d 1211 (Utah 2004). 
In addressing this issue, the City has adopted the extreme position that "[b]ecause 
the right to contest a bond in a bond validation hearing does not implicate a liberty or 
property interest, notice is not required to meet due process." (Appellee Br. at 41). 
However, validation of the bond will result in increased property taxes for JRRN, deprive 
JRRN of its right to challenge the bond in court, and result in the entry of a permanent 
injunction against JRRN that prevents it from contesting the validity of the bond or any 
other matter adjudicated in the bond validation proceedings. Therefore, because the bond 
hearing validates the City's attempt to levy personal funds, the property owners of Salt 
Lake City are entitled to foil due process and their day in court. See Richards v. 
Jefferson County, 517 U.S. 793, 803 (1996). See also Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923) (holding that the interest of a taxpayer of a 
municipality in the application of levied moneys is direct and immediate). 
Indeed, other jurisdictions considering due process in the context of bond 
validation hearings have almost universally found a constitutionally protected interest 
that requires the creation of personal jurisdiction. For example, in Castevens v. Stanly 
County, 191 S.E. 739, 745 (N.C. 1937), the Supreme Court of North Carolina held that 
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"[n]o decree or judgment adverse to [a owner of taxable property or a citizen] 's rights can 
be rendered in an action instituted and prosecuted in accordance with the provisions of [a 
bond validation statute], until every taxpayer and citizen of the unit has been lawfully 
served with summons, and until he has had ample opportunity to appear, and file such 
pleadings as he may wish." (emphasis added). The Catstevens decision further notes that 
the right to service is a constitutional one. Id. See also City of Sacramento v. Drew, 255 
Cal. Rptr. 704, 2207 Cal.App.3d 1287, 1304-05 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989) (holding that legal 
intervention in a validation action "enforces an important public right" because 
u[imposition of an unlawful levy is a species of taxation without representation"); In re 
Validation of $7,800,000 Combined Utility System Revenue Bond, Gautier Utility Dist., 
Jackson County, 465 So.2d 1003, 1008 (Miss. 1985) (holding that a citizen has a due 
process right uof access to a judicial forum to present with respect to the bond issue any 
objection based in principle as distinguished from policy, and there to raise the question 
of whether the political subdivision has exceeded the substantive limitations upon its 
legislative power"). In contrast, the sole case cited by the City in support of its position, 
Denham Springs Economic Development Dist. v. All Taxpayers, Property Owners and 
Citizens of Denham Springs Economic Development Dist, 945 So.2d 665 (La. 2006) is 
easily distinguished. Denham Springs involved bonds issued by a specially created 
economic development district that were not to be paid back through increased taxation. 
945 So.2d at 677-78. Instead, the bonds were to be paid back under a cooperative 
endeavor agreement that involved re-dedication of a small percentage of the existing 
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sales and use taxes of several different municipal and state actors. IdL Thus the Denham 
Springs court held that "the right to challenge the legality of the cooperative endeavor 
agreement" did not involve a constitutionally protected liberty or property interest 
because the cooperative endeavor agreement was "a public action that only has a indirect 
impact on [the taxpayers] interests." Id. at 683-84 (emphasis added). As a result, the 
circumstances and holding in Denham Springs have no bearing on this case. 
A. The district court failed to fulfill the notice requirements under the Utah 
Bonding Act because the ICR's readership in Salt Lake City is unknown. 
The district court's order must be vacated because the Bond Validation Act's 
notice requirement was not fulfilled. The Bond Validation Act requires that the district 
court publish notice of the hearing "in a newspaper published or of general circulation 
within the boundaries of the public body." Utah Code Ann. §ll-30-5(a)(i) (emphasis 
added). In this case, no evidence was presented regarding the ICR's circulation in Salt 
Lake City and the City has conceded that there is no evidence that the IRC had at least 
200 subscribers in Salt Lake City. (Appellee Br. at 37). Instead, the City argues that 
notice in the IRC meets the requirements of the Bond Validation Act because the IRC is 
published in Salt Lake City. IdL However, no evidence was presented at the hearing 
regarding where the IRC is published or the meaning of this term.2 
2
 The City cites to the ICR's webpage regarding its circulation in Salt Lake County as 
evidence of where the ICR is published. However, the webpage does not contain any 
mention of where the ICR is published. (App. Appx. 266.) 
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Furthermore, the City has interpreted "published" as meaning printed within the 
municipality. However, such an interpretation of the Bond Validation Act's notice 
requirement renders it both nonsensical and unconstitutional on its face. Under the City's 
interpretation, placing notice in a newspaper that is published in Salt Lake City but has no 
subscribers or readership within the municipality would fulfill the notice requirement. 
For example, a newspaper that only addresses topics relevant to Provo, Utah, is only 
circulated in Provo, Utah, and in only subscribed to by residents of Provo, Utah, would 
still fulfill the notice requirements for a Salt Lake City bond if its printing presses were 
located in Salt Lake City. However, publication of notice in such a newspaper would, in 
reality, deprive the residents of Salt Lake City of any notice of the proceedings. 
In addition, the City's interpretation of "published" frustrates the legislature's 
intent that the notice requirement comply with Utah law on personal jurisdiction. This 
intent is expressed in the second part of the notice provision, which states that "if the 
public body has no defined boundaries or there is no newspaper published or of general 
circulation within the defined boundaries, [notice shall be published in] a newspaper 
reasonably calculated to notify all parties, which has been approved by the court." Utah 
Code Ann. §ll-30-5(a)(ii) (emphasis added). This provision virtually mirrors the 
language used by this Court in Jackson Const. Co., Inc. v. Marrs, 2004 UT 89, f22, 100 
P.3d 1211 (Utah 2004), holding that once service by publication is authorized, it must be 
"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the 
pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practicable." 
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As a result, the notice requirements better harmonizes with the legislature's intent 
if "published" is interpreted as meaning "to distribute copies (of a work) to the public." 
See Black's Law Dictionary, Abridged 999 (7th Ed. 2000). And, in order to avoid 
redundancy or rendering the alternate requirement of general circulation meaningless, the 
form of distribution intended by "published" in the context of the notice requirement 
would be distribution to non-subscribers. In other words, in order to be "published" 
within the municipality, a newspaper must be available at newsstand and other retail 
locations within the municipality. And, as a matter of practicality, a newspaper need a 
large non-subscription circulation in order to maintain its newsstand distribution network, 
thus ensuring that the newspaper is one that is reasonably calculated to provide notice to 
interested parties. Significantly, the evidence presented at the hearing does not show that 
the ICR is available at newsstands or other retail outlets within Salt Lake City. (App. 
Appx. 266). Instead, the evidence strongly implies that the ICR is a subscription-only 
newspaper. As a result, placing notice in the ICR did not meet the Bond Validation Act's 
requirement that notice be placed in a newspaper "published" within the municipality. 
B. Alternatively, publication of notice in ICR and Utahlegals.com was not 
reasonably calculated to actually inform affected parties of the bond 
validation proceeding. 
Even if the notice fulfilled the requirements of the Utah Bonding Act, the district 
court violated JRRNPs due process rights because the notice was not the means most 
"reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise the interested parties of the 
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pendency of the action to the extent reasonably possible or practical." In this case, the 
City has provided no evidence for why notice by mail was neither reasonably possible 
nor practical under the circumstances. Nor has the City provided any explanation why 
publication in a newspaper with a large newsstand and subscription circulation, such as 
the Salt Lake Tribune or The Desret News, was not possible or practical under the 
circumstances. And while the City has claimed that publication on Utahlegals.com made 
up for any shortfalls in ICR's circulation, no evidence was presented at the hearing 
regarding the size of the audience in Salt Lake City for notices on Utahlegals.com. 
In addition, while other jurisdictions have found service by publication sufficient, 
those cases have always involved publication in a newspaper with a large circulation in 
the municipality issuing the bond. Thus, in Thomas v. Alabama Mun. Elec. Authority, 
432 So.2d 470, 477 (Ala. 1983), the Supreme Court of Alabama upheld service by 
publication in the context of the State's issuance of bonds. However, the Thomas court 
still held that "[t]he method of notice chosen must give reasonable assurance of actually 
giving notice in light of the other available means." Id (citing Mullane v. Cent. Hanover 
Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950)). Accordingly, the court upheld service by 
publication because "[t]he Legislature could reasonably determine that notice by 
publication in newspapers published in the four largest cities of the State, was best 
calculated to apprise the large class of defendants of the commencement of these 
proceedings." Id. Similarly, in this case, the district court could not obtain personal 
jurisdiction over JRRN by publishing the notice in just any newspaper in Salt Lake City. 
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Instead, the district court needed to choose the newspaper with the largest possible 
readership and audience in Salt Lake City. However, in finding that publication in the 
ICR fulfilled due process, the district court provided no basis for why that newspaper was 
the one most reasonably calculated to apprise interested parties in Salt Lake City of the 
validation proceeding. Indeed, given the alternative choices of the Deseret News and the 
Salt Lake Tribune, the selection of the ICR appears to have been arbitrary and capricious. 
Accordingly, publication in the ICR did not confer personal jurisdiction over JRRN. 
Ironically, even the City concedes that the ICR does not have a greater readership 
in Salt Lake City than the Salt Lake Tribune and the Deseret News when it claims that 
articles about the hearing published in the Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News were 
sufficient to satisfy due process. (Appellee Br. at 48). However, the articles in question 
merely stated that a hearing was to be held in the third district court on February 9, 2011. 
The articles did not provide the case number, did not provide any information regarding 
the City's Petition, and did not clearly notify citizens and taxpayers of their right to 
participate and argue their cases at the hearing. (App. Appx. 1036-1044.) And, most 
significantly, the articles were only published once. If an interested party did not read the 
newspaper on that particular day, she would never have seen the article. Just as 
problematically, the City appears to be arguing that service by publication can now occur 
through newspaper articles mentioning the existence of a lawsuit, without the need for 
any publication of formal notice. However, this Court cannot adopt such a position 
because it would not only eviscerate this Court's precedent regarding service by 
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publication, but also run afoul of the due process standards established by the United 
States Supreme Court. As a result, the publication of articles regarding the hearing in the 
Salt Lake Tribune and Deseret News cannot be the basis for conferring personal 
jurisdiction over JRRN. 
Similarly, actual notice was not sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction under the 
circumstances of this case. Unless service has been waived, it is proper service of 
process, not actual notice, which confers personal jurisdiction. See e.g. Saysavanh v. 
Savsavanh, 2006 UT App 385, 145 P.3d 1166, [^25 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) ("Service of 
summons in conformance with the mode prescribed by statute is deemed jurisdictional, 
for it is service of process, not actual knowledge of the commencement of the action, 
which confers jurisdiction"). This is especially true in this case, where a party that does 
not appear at the hearing is barred from filing an appeal or bringing a collateral action. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 11-30-8, 11-30-10. If actual notice were sufficient to confer 
jurisdiction in a bond validation hearing, bond validation hearings would be effectively 
insulated from any challenge based on lack of notice. Parties who did not receive notice 
and therefore did not appear at the hearing would not only be barred from appealing the 
hearing based on lack of notice, they would be permanently enjoined from attacking 
personal jurisdiction through a collateral action. On the other hand, parties who received 
actual notice and appeared at the hearing to object and argue their case would be deemed 
to have waived their right to object. In short, deficiencies in notice and personal 
jurisdiction in bond validation hearings would effectively evade all appellate scrutiny. In 
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order to avoid such a possibility, this Court must hold that actual notice and appearing at 
the hearing does not result in waiver of any objections to notice and personal jurisdiction. 
II. The City either violated the Bonding Act's requirement that it receive public 
input on the issuance of bonds or it never had standing to bring the bond 
validation action in the first place. 
The City's bond issuance is invalid because the City failed to hold a public hearing 
prior to authorizing issuance of the bonds.3 The City does not and cannot dispute that it 
failed to hold any public hearings prior to authorizing the Initial Bond Resolution. 
Instead, it claims that the statutory requirement to hold a public hearing can still be 
satisfied if the City holds a hearing at any time prior to issuing the bonds. (Appellee Br. 
at 25). The City explains that this is because the City Council can choose not to issue a 
Final Bond Resolution based upon input from the public hearing. IcL at 25-26. 
3
 The City claims that JRRN has failed to preserve this issue. However, it was plain error 
for the district court to find the bond valid after holding that the City's failed to satisfy 
the public hearing requirement of Utah Code Ann. §11-14-318. See Meadow Valley 
Contrs., Inc. v. State DOT, 2011 UT 35, J^ 17 (plain error exists where there is (i) an 
error; (ii) that should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) that is harmful). 
Furthermore, this issue was raised in JRRN's brief to the district court in which JRRN 
argued that the Initial Bond Resolution did not confer the City standing to pursue a bond 
validation action. (App. Appx. 1090-91). Specifically, JRRN argued that adoption of the 
initial bond resolution could not confer standing for a bond proceeding because the City 
had not yet held the required public hearing. Id. It was only after the district court held 
that the Initial Bond Resolution provided a sufficient basis for the bond validation 
proceeding that JRRN could raise the logical corollary - that holding the hearing after 
passage of the initial bond resolution failed to comply with the Bonding Act. It should 
also be noted that, because the validation proceeding does not provide for discovery and 
occurs over an extremely short time frame, a defendant at a validation hearing does not 
have the same time and preparation to raise and preserve arguments as a defendant in a 
normal court proceeding. Instead, the burden of discovering material errors and 
omissions in the bonding process rests primarily with the district court. 
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Presumably, under the City's argument, the City Council could also materially amend the 
terms of the final bond resolution based upon public input. Yet, at the same time, the 
City still maintains that the Initial Bond Resolution is sufficiently final to permit 
validation of the bond issuance. Id at 25. Such an interpretation renders the Bond 
Validation Act and the requirement for a public hearing under the Bonding Act 
meaningless. 
The purpose of the Bond Validation Act is to lend finality to the bond issuance 
process. Once a court has entered an order validating issuance of a bond, the bond and 
the process for issuing the bond are no longer subject to challenge. By claiming that the 
Initial Bond Resolution was sufficiently final to allow for bond validation, the City is 
arguing that it could have initiated a bond validation hearing and validated the bond 
issuance immediately after authorizing the Initial Bond Resolution but prior to holding 
the statutorily mandated public hearing. However, once the bond is validated, the City's 
issuance of the bond cannot be challenged even if the City never held the required public 
hearing. And, significantly, the City has adopted a position under which the City Council 
still has leeway, after validation of the bond, to not approve the Final Bond Resolution or 
materially change its terms. Even an amendment to the Final Bond Resolution that was 
clearly outside the City's discretion, such as increasing the amount of the bond or 
changing its purpose, would no longer be subject to challenge. In effect, the bond 
validation proceeding would become a "rubber stamp" to foreclose challenge to a final 
bond resolution while leaving the City unfettered discretion to disregard any remaining 
14 
procedural requirements or amend that final bond resolution in any manner whatsoever. 
As a result, the City's interpretation of the Bonding Act and the Bond Validation Act is 
simply untenable. 
Either the Initial Bond Resolution is a final authorization of the bond that cannot 
be modified after the bond has been validated or the Initial Bond Resolution is a 
preliminary authorization that is subject to later modification and/or rejection. It cannot 
be both. If this Court finds that adoption of the Initial Bond Resolution constituted a final 
authorization for the bonds sufficient to invoke the Bond Validation Act, the City's 
failure to hold the statutorily mandated public hearing prior to adopting the Initial Bond 
Resolution is fatal to validation of the bonds. On the other hand, if the Court finds that 
the Initial Bond Resolution is only a preliminary authorization and the terms for issuance 
of the bonds are subject to modification at any time prior to adoption of the Final Bond 
Resolution, it must hold that the Initial Bond Resolution cannot be the basis for a bond 
validation action.4 
Despite the lack of any evidence supporting its finding, the district court held that 
the adoption of an initial bond resolution followed by a final bond resolution after the 
bond validation was customary practice and practically necessary. (App. Appx. 1605-
06). This may be the case if and when a municipality has completed all of the statutorily 
mandated procedures and hearings prior to adoption of the initial bond resolution, and the 
4
 Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §11-30-3. a petition to establish the validity of bonds may 
only be filed "after [the public body] has authorized the issuance of bonds ... but before 
the issuance and delivery of any such bonds." Utah Code Ann. §11-30-3(1). 
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initial bond resolution includes terms that fully and completely eliminate the City 
Council's ability to adopt a materially different final bond resolution. That is not the case 
here. Instead, by its own terms, the Initial Bond Resolution in this case does not fully 
authorize the issuance of the Bond. Furthermore, the Initial Bond Resolution notes that 
all of the proceedings necessary for authorization of the Bond have not yet been 
completed, including the requirement for a public hearing under Utah Code Ann. §11-14-
318. As a result, the City's failure to hold a public hearing prior to adopting the Initial 
Bond Resolution appears to have created a unique circumstance. 
Furthermore, the City has failed to provide any evidence or argument that it 
actually held the statutorily mandated public hearing. The district court expressly refused 
to find that the City's March 2010 hearing constituted the "hearing required by Utah 
Code section 11-14-318." (App. Appx. 1536.) Nor did it hold that the December 2010 
hearing fulfilled the statutory mandate for a public hearing. Instead, the district court 
only found that notice for these meetings was adequate. As a result, while the City 
argues that notice for the March 2010 and December 2010 meetings was proper, it makes 
only a cursory reference to whether the meetings themselves complied with Utah Code 
Ann. §11-14-318. (Appellee Br. at 26). In fact, the City concedes that the December 
meeting was conducted in exactly the same manner as the March hearing that did not 
satisfy the hearing requirement of Utah Code Ann. § 11-14-318. Id at 17. The City now 
claims that, even if the March and December hearings did not meet the statutory 
requirements, public comments taken during "the Comments to the City Council period" 
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prior to passage of the Final Bond Resolution are sufficient to satisfy the public input 
requirement of Utah Code Ann. §11-14-318. (Appellee Br. at 28 n.l 1). However, even 
if public comments could supplant a statutorily required hearing, comments taken after 
the bond has been validated should never be able to meet the public input requirements of 
the Bonding Act. As a result, the district court's order must be vacated because there was 
no finding that the City had complied with the public hearing requirement of Utah Code 
Ann. §11-14-318. 
III. The district court erred in holding that the City had discretion to issue bonds 
to fund a project that is barely half the scope of what voters were told they 
were funding. 
The district court erred in holding that the City had discretion to issue bonds for a 
project that is materially different from the one approved by voters.5 While a 
municipality has discretion to change the scope of a project for which bonds are issued, 
this discretion is not unfettered. In this case, by choosing to pursue a project that is 
barely half the scope of what voters were promised, the City has exceeded the bounds of 
its discretion. The City has not disputed, nor can it, that the scope of the project has 
5
 The City has argued that this issue is a question of fact and that the Court may affirm 
the findings below because JRRN has failed to marshall the evidence. However, the case 
cited in support of the City's proposed standard of review, Bluffdale Mountain Homes, 
LC. v. Bluffdale City, 2007 UT 57, f46 (Utah 2007), only applies to determinations of 
viability under a statute allowing property owners to disconnect their property from a 
city. It has nothing to do with the issues or the standards of review applicable in this 
case. Instead, this Court has treated previous cases challenging bond issuances as raising 
questions of law. See Gardner v. Davis County, 523 P.2d 865 (Utah 1974); Ricker v. 
Board of Educ. of Millard County School DisU 396 P.2d 416 (Utah 1964). 
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changed significantly from the project proposed in the Voter Information Pamphlet. 
Instead, the City has claimed that this Court should not consider the Voter Information 
Pamphlet and that the City still acts within its discretion as long as the purpose of the 
project remains the same. (Appellee Br. at 29-31). Both of these arguments fail. 
First, it is appropriate for the Court to consider the Voter Information Pamphlet. 
In Ricker, this Court considered information outside of the ballot language on the 
assumption that "the public reasonably could and did regard the [collateral statements or 
explanatory material] as to the various school needs as part of the notice of the election." 
396 P.2 at 419. The Ricker court considered this extraneous material despite the trial 
court's express finding that the representations in the election brochure were not intended 
to mislead or deceive. 396 P.2d at 419. Similarly, in this case, the Voter Information 
Pamphlet and the Salt Lake Tribune article describing the project were published 
contemporaneously with the election notice. Indeed, the City has admitted that "it 
intended for citizens to rely on its representations in the Voter Information Pamphlet." 
(Hr'g Tr. at 21). And the City itself has claimed that articles in the Salt Lake Tribune are 
as effective as publication of legal notice. (Appellee Br. at 48). As a result, it is both 
appropriate and necessary that this Court consider the Voter Information Pamphlet in 
determining the scope of the project that voters approved. 
Second, the City does not have unlimited discretion to change the scope of a 
project as long as it maintains the same general "purpose." Once a municipality has 
represented the details of a project as well as its general purpose, its discretion is 
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constrained by those details. While the cases cited by the City grant a municipality 
considerable discretion, none stand for the proposition that this discretion is unlimited as 
long as the general purpose presented to the voters is upheld. In Ricker, a school district 
represented to voters that the purpose of the bond was to construct and remodel school 
buildings. 396 P.2d at 419. As detailed in the accompanying election brochure, the bond 
proceeds were to be used to construct a new combined junior and senior high school in 
Delta, build a new farm shop and remodel another high school in Fillmore, and all 
remaining funds used to generally remodel elementary schools. Id. The bond was 
challenged when the school district revealed that, due to cost increases, it would not be 
able to direct as much money towards the elementary school remodeling projects as 
initially represented. Id. However, construction of the new high school in Delta, the 
farm shop and remodel for the high school in Fillmore, and remodeling of the elementary 
schools would still proceed. IcL Under those circumstances, this Court held that the 
school district acted within its discretion in choosing how to allocate moneys between 
each specific project. IdL at 419-20. However, Ricker did not grant the school district 
unlimited discretion as long as it used the bond funds to construct or remodel schools. 
For example, the Court never considered whether the school district had discretion to use 
the bond funds to build an elementary school in Nephi instead of the promised high 
schools in Delta and Fillmore. As a result, while Ricker is instructive regarding when a 
bond issuer acts within its discretion, it fails to address the limits of that discretion. 
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Similarly, the Gardner case also fails to address the limits of discretion. Gardner 
notes that, due to changed circumstances, it is no longer viable to pursue a project that 
fulfills the representations made to the voters. When that situation occurs, the 
municipality has the discretion to abandon the project and use any related funds to retire 
the bonds. 523 P.2d 865. Specifically, in Gardner, Davis County had issued bonds in 
order to construct hospital facilities. Id, However, necessary federal funding could not 
be obtained and the project was no longer viable. Id Under those circumstances, this 
Court held that the county had discretion to abandon the project, retire the bond, and give 
the citizens their money back. Id. at 867-68. Again, the Court did not grant unfettered 
discretion by, for example, holding that the county had the discretion to deal with the lack 
of funding by building a small medical clinic rather than the promised hospitals. 
And, contrary to the City's claims, other jurisdictions that have considered the 
issue have found that a municipality's discretion is limited when it chooses to make 
detailed representations regarding a project. See e j ^ Devorsky v. La Vega Ind. Sch. 
DisU 635 S.W. 2d 904 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982); State ex rel. Traeger v. Carleton, 64 
N.W.2d 776, 778 (Minn. 1954); OTarrell v. Sonoma County. 208 P. 117 (Cal. 1922). 
The City has attempted to distinguish the earlier decisions by claiming that they involved 
ballot language that was more specific than the ballot language used in this case. But this 
case is no different once the City's detailed representations in the Voter Election 
Pamphlet and other extraneous material are taken into consideration. Furthermore, the 
City attempts to distinguish Devorsky by claiming that it was overruled and involved 
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intentional misrepresentations by the school district. In reality, Texas did not "overrule 
Devorsky and refuse[ ] to consider representations outside of the official orders and 
resolutions." (Appellee Br. at 35). Instead, Texas later held that "a political subdivision 
cannot be bound by the representations of individual council members or the City staff." 
Taxpayers for Sensible Priorities v. City of Dallas, 79 S.W.3d 670, 675 (Tex.App. 2002). 
Nor did Devorsky involve intentional misrepresentations. (Appellee Br. at 34). Instead, 
as in this case, the municipality "knew that all of the voters would rely upon these 
representations, knew that the representations were material to the election, and knew and 
intended that the representations would induce voters to vote for rather than against the 
bond issue" and, after the ballot initiative had been approved, chose not follow through 
on those representations. Devorsky, 635 S.W. 2d at 908. There was no allegation in 
Devorsky that the municipality had intended to renege on the representations at the time 
they were made. Id. A s a result, the similarity of Devorsky to the facts of this case 
remains striking. 
In summary, this case raises a matter of first impression in Utah - the bounds of a 
municipality's discretion in implementing a project that has been detailed to the voters. 
The City has claimed that it has unlimited discretion as long as the ultimate project 
conforms to the same general purpose promised to the voters. Such an interpretation of 
municipal discretion cannot be correct. Under the City's view, the City would still act 
within its discretion if it built a multi-million dollar state-of-the-art 5-acre playground and 
skateboard park rather than the 220-acre sports complex promised to tax payers - even 
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though the playground clearly does not fulfill the representations of the Voter 
Information Pamphlet, it would still fall within the same "general purpose." As a matter 
of public policy, the unfettered discretion that the City seeks is ripe for abuse and offends 
justice and equity. See Ridker, 396 P.2d 420. The City's conduct here falls outside of 
the bounds of the City's discretion because the project is significantly and materially 
different from what voters were promised. As a result, the bond issuance cannot be 
validated and the district court's order must be vacated. 
IV. The district court erred in holding that the City's authorization of the bond 
did not violate Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-406. 
The district court erroneously dismissed JRRN's argument that the adoption of the 
Initial Bond Resolution violated Utah Code Ann. §10-9a-406, which prohibits 
authorization of a publicly owned structure until and unless it conforms to the City's 
general plan. Here, the location of the project has been approved and is not subject to 
debate or later change. Furthermore, the City does not dispute that the Initial Bond 
Resolution authorizes funding for the project and that has even characterized adoption of 
the Initial Bond Resolution as having "approved the final deal." (App. Appx. 1746.) 
Instead, the City attempts to distinguish authorization of funding for the project from 
authorization for the project itself. (Appellee Br. at 35). Such a distinction rings hollow. 
There is no single isolated step under which a municipality authorizes a publicly owned 
structure. Instead, a municipality provides authorization through multiple parallel 
processes. Providing funding for the construction of the structure, when its location has 
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already been decided, is one form of such authorization. As a result, adoption of the 
Initial Bond Resolution resulted, at the very least, in authorization of some aspects of the 
project. However, because the district court summarily dismissed this issue as irrelevant, 
it never entered any findings of facts or conclusions of law on whether the project 
authorized by the Initial Bond resolution complied with the City's general plan. 
Accordingly, this issue should be remanded to the district court to make appropriate 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
CONCLUSION 
The Bonding Act and the Bond Validation Act contain both procedural and 
substantive safeguards to prevent taxpayers from being levied for a project that they did 
not approve. In this case, not only have these safeguards have been violated, but the City 
has advocated an interpretation of the bonding acts that would allow these safeguards to 
circumvented in the future with impunity. This should not be permitted. 
First, the district court violated the Bond Validation Act and due process when it 
did not mail notice and chose to publish notice of the bond validation proceeding in the 
Intermountain Commercial Record rather than the Deseret News or the Salt Lake 
Tribune. The City has argued that notice is not constitutionally required and that 
technically fulfilling the notice requirements of the bonding act is sufficient, even if the 
notice is not reasonably intended to and does not, in fact, apprise all interested parties of 
the action. As a matter of public policy, this cannot be correct. This Court should 
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therefore vacate the district court's order and remand for a new bond validation 
proceeding after notice has been properly served. 
Second, the City failed to hold the statutorily mandated public hearing prior to 
adopting the Initial Bond Resolution. Moreover, the district court failed to find that the 
City's hearings satisfied the public hearing requirement of the Bonding Act. The City 
has argued that the public hearings can be held at any time prior to issuance of the bond, 
including after the bond issuance has been validated. It has even argued that public 
comments, rather than a hearing, are sufficient to meet the public hearing requirement. 
However, allowing a municipality to fulfill requirements of the bonding act after 
validation of the bond issuance eviscerates the procedural requirements of the Bonding 
Act. Because City's failed to fulfill the procedural requirements of the Bonding Act, this 
Court should vacate the district court's order. 
Third, the City has exceeded the bounds of its discretion by seeking to use bond 
funds for a materially different project from the one that voters were told they were 
authorizing in 2003. The City has argued that it is not bound by its detailed 
representations and has unlimited discretion as long as the project conforms to the 
"general purpose" of the ballot initiative. This position deprives voters of any assurance 
that the bonds they approve will be spent on the project that they were promised. Here, 
the voters were promised a project that was almost twice the size of what the City now 
proposes. As a result, the Court should find that the City exceeded its discretion and 
vacate the district court's order. 
24 
DATED this 11th day of October, 2011. 
NADESAN BECK P.C. 
Kg&kikNadesan 
•LePendu 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
This is to certify that on the 11th day of October, 2011, two true and correct copies of the 
Reply Brief of JRRN Appellants was served on the following via U.S. Mail: 
Edwin P. Rutan, II 
J. Wesley Robinson 
Evelyn J. Furse 
Salt Lake City Attorney's Office 
P.O. Box 145478 
451 South State Street, Suite 505 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-5478 
Hans Ehrbar 
1411 Utah Street, Apt. 24 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Lucy Knorr 
507 5th Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84103 
M. Ray Kingston 
1070 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Raymond W. Wheeler 
1115 Mead Avenue 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8410 
25 
